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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PLEADING
JOINDER OF ACTIONS IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES
The administrator of one Charles Betts, deceased, joined a cause
of action for property damage with one for the wrongful death of the
decedent, both claims arising out of the same accident. Ruling upon a
demurrer for misjoinder of causes, the common pleas court found that
the two causes of action were not prosecuted in the same right and
therefore could not be joined. Betz v. Hart, 4 Ohio Op. 174, 2o Abs.
479 ('935).
In the event of a wrongful death two causes of action may arise,
but each is inherently separate and distinct. R. R. v. Van Alstine, 77
Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 6oi (19o8) ; May Coal Go. v. Robinette, 120
Ohio St. 11o, 165 N.E. 576 (1929). Ohio Gen. Code: sec. 11235
provides for the survival to the estate of a deceased person of any cause
of action arising out of an injury to his person or property which he
himself could have maintained but for his death. Ohio Gen. Code: secs.
10509-166 and 10509-167, the Ohio wrongful death statutes, permit
an action for the benefit of certain named beneficiaries for the damage
resulting to them because of the death. Both actions are maintainable
in the name of the personal representative. Ohio Gen. Code: sec. I I3o6
allows the joinder of several causes of action in the same petition when
they are included in certain named categories, among which are (4)
injuries to the person or property, and (2) transactions connected with
the same subject for action. Gen Code: sec. I 1307 limits this provision,
however, by requiring that the causes so joined must affect all parties to
the action. Heinrichsdorff v. Keppler Bros., 3 Ohio L. R. 476, 34 Ohio
C. D. 83 (915). This requirement was so interpreted by the court
in the principal case as to restrict the possibility of joinder to those causes
which are prosecuted in the same right. This would seem to be an
unnecessary extension of the general rule that a party cannot sue in
more than one distinct capacity, Dusenbury v. Sagamore Co., 142 N. Y.
S. 595, 157 App. Div. 485 (1913); Stock Growers' Bank v. Newton,
13 Colo. 245, 22 Pac. 444 (1889); especially where one cause exists
in his own favor and one in that of another. Glidden v. Cincinnati, I I
Ohio D. R. 853, 3o Bull. 213 (1893); Wragg v. Wragg, 208 Iowa
939, 226 N.W. 99 (1929). The law regards him as a separate party
in each of such relations. May v. Smith, 45 N. C. 196, 59 Am. Dec.
594 (1853); Pensacola Co. v. Soderlind, 6o Fla. 154, 53 So. 722
(191 o). Thus an administrator of two decedents cannot join causes of
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action belonging to the two estates in one proceeding even though they
involve a common defendant. Danaher v. City of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y.
Civ. Proc. R. 286 (x883).
The Ohio lower courts have given Gen. Code: sec. 11307 a rather
loose construction and in several instances they have permitted the
joinder of causes not affecting all the parties. i Ohio Jur. 372, 374;
Myers v. Miller, 2 Ohio D.R. 319 (1857); Gravell v. Speakman, 8
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 246, 2o Ohio D.N.P. 89 (19o9); Sicbern v. Meyer,
i i Ohio D. R. 344, 26 Bull. 147 (1891). These holdings contravene
the express terms of the statute, however, and should not be followed so
long as the statute stands. 1 Ohio Jur. 375; McShafer v. Henry, 19
Ohio Abs. 283 (1935). Nevertheless these decisions are important as
indications of the attitude of the Ohio courts toward joinder in general,
and in the light of them, it is quite likely that considerable latitude will
be given to considerations of convenience and expediency in the joinder
problem generally.
It is quite true that, in a sense, the two actions are not prosecuted
in the same right, as expressed in two decisions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio. R. R. v. Vandlstine, supra, and May Coal Co. v. Robinette,
supra. Nevertheless the conclusion drawn by the court in the principal
case is not the necessary consequence of such holdings inasmuch as they
merely decided that two independent causes of action are provided by
the two statutes and, consequently, that the bringing of one such action
is no bar to the prosecution of the other. The law relating to this ques-
tion is in a somewhat unsettled state, however, and this is evidenced by
the writings of several textwriters. Thus in 13 Ohio Jur. 562, it is
stated that such joinder is proper, whereas the contrary proposition is
endorsed by Bliss on Code Pleading p. 198 and by Bates "Pleading,
Practice, Parties, and Forms," p. 1214. These writers assert that
joinder is not allowable because the causes are not prosecuted in the
same right. Only the two latter authorities are cited by the principal case.
Unfortunately, the case authority resorted to by these writers fails to
sustain the rule set forth by them. The cases cited by Bates are only
slightly analogous to the issue and, in the light of the illustrations used
by him to support his text, it appears that he had reference to the joinder
of causes in different capacities rather than in different rights.
Some of the case authority resorted to by Bates does have a bearing
on the general problem but none of it is applicable to the Ohio law.
Thus the case of Louisville and Nashuille R. R. v. Kellem, 13 Ky. Law
Rep. 228 (189i) is not in point because the substantive law of Ken-
tucky requires the plaintiff to elect between the two causes, and a
recovery on the one cause of action is a bar to a recovery on the other,
as has been decided in Hackett v. R. R., 95 Ky. 236, 24 S.W. 87i
(1894), and Louisville R. R. v. Raymond, 135 Ky. 738, 123 S.W.
281, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 176 (i9o9). Hurst v. Detroit City R. A.,
84 Mich. 539, 48 N.. 44 (i89i), was decided in a jurisdiction which
allows two remedies but only one recovery in death actions. Sweetland
v.R.R., 117 Mich. 329,75 N.W. io66; Carbary v.R. R., 157 Mich.
683, 122 N. . 367 (i9o9). Frink v. Taylor, 4 G. Gr. (Iowa) 196
(1854); and Lucas v. N. Y. C. R. R., 21 Barb. (N.Y.) 245 (1855)
are not authority for the proposition stated by Bates because in each of
these cases the party brought suit in his individual capacity on one cause
and as the administrator of the estate on the other. McVey v. Illinois
Central R. R., 73 Miss. 487, 19 So. 209 (895) provided no oppor-
tunity for joinder because of a holding that survival actions are not
maintainable when death is instantaneous. This left the plaintiff with
only one cause of action. The cases of Daley v. Boston R. R., 147 Mass.
ioi, i6 N.E. 690 (i888) and Cincinnati H. and D. R. R. v. Chester,
57 (N.D.) 297 (877) are of no relevancy to the question under dis-
cussion. The principal case also directs the reader to i R.C.L. at p. 366,
but the two cases there cited are from Kentucky and consequently are
not in point, see supra. Moreover the contrary proposition is also set
forth on the same page of that volume.
In support of the holding in the principal case it might be said that
these causes of action are inherently independent; St. Louis, etc. R. R. v.
Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct. 704, 59 L. Ed. 76o (915), that
they are not prosecuted in the same identical right R. R. v. Van .4lstine,
sutra; May Coal Co. v. Robinette, supra, and that there are differences
in the beneficiaries and in the measure of damages. One cause of action
grounds a recovery for all damage suffered up to the death, the other
for that ensuing thereafter. The administrator is, in effect, made the
trustee of two separate funds for two distinct purposes. His interest in
each case is entirely separate and distinct. As the representative of the
wrongful death beneficiaries the cause of action in favor of the estate
does not affect him, and as a representative of the estate that of the bene-
ficiaries does not concern him. Wherefore it is said that technically he
serves in two distinct capacities, just as if the legislature had appointed
two independent agents.
It is said in answer, however, that none of these considerations in-
volves any serious difficulty in the trial of the two causes together, nor
do they occasion any delay, prejudice, or undue confusion to the de-
fendant. Consequently, the majority of jurisdictions today do permit
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a joinder of these two causes of action. Illinois Central R. R. v. Crudup,
63 Miss. 291 (1885); St. Louis, etc. R. R. v. Hengst, 36 Tex. Civ.
App. 217, 81 S.W. 832 (1904); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Bath Co., lo8
Nebr. 168, 187 N.W. 807 (1922); Chicago R. I. & P. R. R. v.
Jenkins, 183 Ark. 1071,40 S.W. (2d) 439,(1931); Ranney v.R.R.,
64 Vt. 277, 24 Ad. 1053 (1892); Nemecek v. Filer Co., 126 Wis. 71,
105 N.W. 225 (1905); Eldridge v. Barton, 232 Mass. 183, 122 N.E.
272 (1919); Callison v. Brake, 129 Fed. 196, 63 C.C.A. 354
(1904). Contra, Bennett v. Sportanburg Co., 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E.
189 (1914); .Anderson v. Wetter, 103 Me. 257, 69 Ad. 105 (1907).
The same broad policy is evidenced in Townsend v. Buckeye Stages,
28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 222 (1930), where a party was allowed to join
counts under both statutes in a death action. This case is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the principal case, however, in that the issue was
presented to the court on a counter-claim in which it was the defendant
who set out the two causes and no demurrer for misjoinder of causes
set forth in a counter-claim is interposable. Ohio Gen. Code, sec.
11324. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the reasons there given by
the court for allowing the joinder of like causes in the plaintiff's original
petition.
The two causes do have a close kinship. The same plea can be
made to both, both can be prosecuted by the same kind of proceedings,
and both may be brought in the name of the same party. Both actions
affect all the formal parties thereto, and in each action the plaintiff
sues in the same capacity, %uz., as the personal representative of the
estate. The damages, in each cause, arise out of the same transaction,
and on claims arising from injuries to the same person. The acts of the
parties, the time, place, and circumstances are the same in each cause
and must be proved by substantially the same evidence. How anomalous
it would be then, to grant a recovery on the one cause and to deny it
on the other. For practical reasons the courts should permit the joinder.
The separate funds recoverable present no difficulty; there is an ade-
quate device in the special verdicts provided for by our law.
Ohio Gen. Code sec. 11306, declaring what causes should be joined,
should receive a liberal construction to prevent a multiplicity of actions.
Cincinnati S. and C. R. R. v. Cook, 37 Ohio St. 265 (1881). It, like
all statutes relating to procedure, is remedial and should be broadly
interpreted. Wellston Co. v. Rinehart, lo8 Ohio St. 117, 14o N.E.
623 (1923). The policy of the law is to discourage, rather than to
encourage litigation. The state itself has an interest in clearing the
dockets so far as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
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parties, yet the necessary effect of the decision noted is to give new life
to an old and technical refinement of very shadowy substance.
Today more and more states are reflecting a far broader policy
toward pleading in general by adopting provisions similar to those con-
tained in the new proposed federal rules which repudiate the strict,
cumbersome, legalistic techniques of a former day in favor of a system
better adapted to a more efficient administration of justice. Therefore,
since the ground has already been broken by the Townsend case, and
since a joinder of these two causes is within the letter and spirit of our
law, it would seem that the way is clear for the courts of Ohio to place
themselves in accord with the more liberal trend of the day. This should
be done as soon as conveniently possible so as to permit such a joinder
as was attempted in the principal case.
ROBIN W. LETT
TORTS
JUDICIAL NOTICE - NEGLIGENCE OF BAILEES - ORDINANCES
AS SAFETY AND INDEMNITY MEASURES
Plaintiff filed an action in Municipal Court of Cincinnati against
defendant for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident
caused by a car owned by defendant and rented to one Jesse Dunn.
The city enacted an ordinance, No. 50-1927, in Feb., 1929, which
provided in effect, that no license to operate any public vehicle should
be issued by City Treasurer until the applicant should deposit with the
City Treasurer a policy of liability insurance, providing for indemnity
for or protection to the insured against loss as provided under this
ordinance. It also provided that it should be unlawful to operate any
such public vehicle, or permit such vehicle to be operated until the
requirements of the ordinance had been complied with, and imposed a
fine for its violation. The defendant in violation of the above ordinance
rented a car to Jesse Dunn against whom the present plaintiff had
obtained a judgment which was not satisfied. The plaintiff in the
present action was denied relief by the Municipal Court, and on appeal
the appellate court reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial
courts, denying plaintiff recovery. Orose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself
Co., 132 Ohio St. 607, 9 N.E. (2d) 671 (1937).
One of the defenses offered was that the upper court would not take
judicial notice of the ordinance, since it was not contained in the record.
